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PHENOMENOLOGY

PHENOMENOLOGY
Tamsin Lorraine
Phenomenology as a philosophical movement was founded by Edmund
Husserl. René Descartes, Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel are important precursors to this movement that insists upon
returning to ‘the things themselves’, or phenomena as they appear to us,
in order to ground knowledge in the apodictic certainty of self-evident
truth. Husserl instituted a method of ‘bracketing’ that suspends metaphysical questions about what is ‘out there’, and instead focuses on phenomenological descriptions of experience itself. Husserl took from Franz
Brentano the notion that consciousness is intentional – that is, that it is
always conscious of something. To investigate what lies outside of consciousness is fruitless. Instead, we should investigate the structure and
contents of our conscious experiences. By suspending the ‘natural attitude’ (that is, the assumption that our experience is caused by something
‘out there’) with its reifying prejudices, we can discover and describe the
‘eidetic essences’ that structure consciousness. This, in turn, will reveal
how our knowledge is constituted and will give us a new method for
grounding knowledge in our ‘pre-predicative experience’ (that is, experience that has not yet been posited from the perspective of the natural
attitude).
Martin Heidegger, Emmanuel Lévinas, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice
Merleau Ponty were some of those inspired by Husserl to develop various
responses to versions of phenomenology. But whereas Husserl thought of
phenomenology as a rigorous science of consciousness, these philosophers
emphasise the notion (created by Heidegger) of ‘being-in-the-world’ and
direct their attention toward the lived experience of an embodied subject
always already immersed in a world from which she cannot separate
herself. Phenomenology’s insistence on describing phenomena as they
appear thus opened up to philosophical reflection the realm of experience as it is experienced by ordinary individuals in everyday life prior to
the theoretical attitude of ‘objective’ thought. It was embraced by many
as a revitalising alternative to forms of philosophical thought such as
positivism (another important philosophical movement prominent in the
early twentieth century) that took the methods of natural science as their
paradigm.
On Deleuze’s view, phenomenology’s emphasis on lived experience
territorialises philosophy onto habitual forms of perception and conception (perception formed from the point of view of the self or thought
in keeping with the form of the ‘I’). Deleuze sought to determine an
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‘impersonal and pre-individual transcendental field’ that is the condition of any actual conscious experience (D 1990: 102). In Foucault,
Deleuze lauds Michel Foucault for converting phenomenology into
epistemology. There is a gap between what we perceive and what we say
‘as though intentionality denied itself ’ (D 1988b: 109). There is no such
thing as a pure or ‘savage’ experience prior to or underlying knowledge.
The gap between what we say and what we feel and perceive (as well as
the Bergsonian gap Deleuze characterises in his Cinema books that can
open up between perception and action) indicates implicit tendencies or
forces that insist in what we say and do. The conscious experiences of an
individual are the emergent effects of virtual, as well as actually unfolding, forces of which the individual is, for the most part, unaware. The
singularities or events defining these forces constitute a transcendental
field of the virtual that may never be actualised in individual bodies.
Events of sense (for example, the concepts of philosophy), as well as
events of physical processes (for example, the capacity to fall, to run,
to sweat) and their virtual relations ‘insist’ in concrete states of affairs,
whether or not they actually unfold in specific speech-acts or physical
states.
Philosophy as ‘genuine thinking’ does not attempt to represent or
describe, but rather to make things happen by creating concepts in
response to the problems of life that actualise the virtual relations of the
transcendental field in novel ways. Phenomenology’s invocation of the
‘primordial lived’ renders immanence in terms of what is immanent to a
subject’s experience rather than processes unfolding at levels below as well
as above the threshold of consciousness, thus grounding its investigations
in what are, in Deleuze and Guattari’s view, opinions that are already
clichés extracted from experience (D&G 1994: 150). The notion of a
world ‘teaming’ with anonymous, nomadic, impersonal and pre individual
singularities opens up the field of the transcendental and allows thinking
of individuals in terms of the singularities that are their condition, rather
than in terms of the synthetic and analytic unities of conscious experience
(D 1990: 103).
Connectives
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Singularity

This content downloaded from 130.58.106.203 on Tue, 21 Jan 2020 16:32:24 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
M2328 - PARR TEXT.indd 207

10/08/2010 16:17

